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BREARD AND THE FEDERAL POWER TO REQUIRE  COMPLIANCE WITH ICJ 
ORDERS OF  PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
	  
 
 
 
 
Among the  puzzling aspects of  the Breard episode was the ?linton administration's 
claim  that  the  decision whether or not  to  comply with  the Order of  the International 
Court of??ustice requiring the postponement of?Breard's execution lay exclusively in the 
hands of the Governor of Virginia. The ICJ's  Order provided that?"[t]he United States 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
21 United  States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942). CompareCohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)  264, 413- 
14 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.). See also Calhoun: "In  our relation to the rest of the world ... the States disappear." 
29 ANNALS OF CONG. 531 (1815-16). 
22 U.S. CONST. Art. II. 
23 /d., Art. VI. 
* Of the Board of Editors. 
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should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not 
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings." The Clinton administration 
argued that the Order was not binding, but it also took the position that, even if the 
order were binding there would be no authority in the federal Government to require a 
postponement of the execution. As the administration explained to the Supreme Court: 
[T]he "measures at [the government's] disposal" are a matter of domestic United 
States law, and our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's ability 
to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the States. The "measures at [the 
United States'] disposal" under our Constitution may in some cases include only 
persuasion . . . That is the situation here.' 
Accordingly, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote a letter to Governor Jim 
Gilmore explaining that it was important to our foreign relations and to the safety of 
American citizens abroad that the ICJ's Order not be flouted, and requesting that the 
Governor protect those interests by postponing the execution. The Governor remained 
unpersuaded. In a statement issued the night of the execution, he said that he had given 
"serious consideration" to the request of the Secretary of State, whose views on foreign 
policy matters are of course "due great respect," but " [a] s Governor of Virginia my first 
duty is to ensure that those who reside within our borders . . . may conduct their lives 
free from the fear of crime.'2 Additionally, he explained that he preferred to disregard 
the ICJ's Order now because doing so later might prove more difficult.3 
It is neither surprising nor particularly objectionable that the Governor of a state 
believes he owes his primary duty to its citizens.4 Although the Framers of the Articles 
of Confederation mistakenly expected state officials voluntarily to subordinate their 
citizens' interests to those of the nation as a whole, the Framers of our Constitution 
clearly understood that state officials would reason as Governor Gilmore did. This was 
obviously a problem-indeed, it was one of the principal problems with the Articles of 
Confederation and among the most important reasons the Founders decided to draft a 
new Constitution. Specifically, state officials (reasoning as Governor Gilmore did) vio- 
lated treaties that had been entered into by the Continental Congress, and the federal 
Government could do nothing more about it than supplicate (as Secretary Albright did) .5 
Describing this state of affairs as "imbecili[c] "6 and "humiliat[ing] ,"7 the Founders fixed 
the problem by giving the federal Government he authority to compel states to comply 
with treaties. First, they declared treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land" and, as 
such, enforceable in the federal courts,8 which in Article III were given jurisdiction over 
cases "arising under" treaties.9 Second, the President in Article II was given the power 
and duty to "faithfully execute" federal law,'0 including treaties. Finally, Congress in 
'Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 
97-8214) (the material in brackets appears in the original). 
2 Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore 
Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard at 2 (Apr. 14, 1998). 
3 "Should the [ICJ] resolve this matter in Paraguay's favor, it would be difficult, having delayed the execution 
so that the [ICJ] could consider the case, to then carry[ ] out the jury's sentence despite the rulings [of] the 
[ICJ]." Id. 
4 But cf Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, supra p. 679, 683 (criticizing 
Gilmore's decision); Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, infra pp. 704, 707-08 (same). 
5 See generally Carlos Manuel Vaizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 
1101-05 (1992). 
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
7Id. at 106. 
8 U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 
89 AJIL 695 (1995). 
9 U.S. CONST. Art. III, ?2, cl. 1. 
10 Id., Art. II, ?3. 
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Article I was given the authority to "provide for calling forth the Militia to enforce the 
Laws of the Union,"' including treaties, as well as to "make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States,"12 including the power to make 
treaties. 
If ICJ orders of provisional measures are binding, they are treaty-based obligations of 
the United States by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, pursuant to which the United States submitted to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, and Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter, pursuant to 
which the United States "under[took] to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any 
case in which it is a party." It is difficult o understand how the administration could 
have concluded that the only measure at the federal Government's disposal under such 
circumstances was to beseech a state Governor to comply with the Order. By hypothesis, 
the law of the land required compliance with the Order and thus preempted the conflict- 
ing state order setting the execution date. The Governor of Virginia and the lower-level 
state officials responsible for carrying out the execution were accordingly required by 
federal law not to execute Breard on the scheduled date. If those state officials threatened 
to violate that duty, then state and federal courts with jurisdiction over the subject matter 
had the authority and indeed the duty to give effect to that treaty-based obligation in 
preference to any conflicting state law. 
To be sure, the administration argued that Paraguay's Vienna Convention-based 
claims should be dismissed (inter alia) on political question grounds.'3 But, whatever 
the merits of this claim,'4 even if accepted it would not establish that the "federal 
Government" lacked the authority to require the relevant state officials to comply with 
the supreme law of the land. For even if the treaty-based uty to comply with ICJ 
orders were judicially unenforceable for political question or similar reasons, there would 
remain the President's authority to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (to 
say nothing of Congress's powers). Putting aside the question whether the President had 
a duty to do something (more) to avert Virginia's violation of the ICJ Order, surely he 
had the power to do so. If the courts lacked the authority to enforce the ICJ Order, 
then the President himself could have issued an executive order postponing Breard's 
execution.'5 The President has the responsibility and authority to "faithfully execute" 
even a law that raises "political questions." Indeed, to say that a law raises political 
" Id., Art. I, ?8, cl. 15. 
12Id., cl. 18. 
'" Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-23, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770). 
14 A group of law professors ubmitted a brief disputing the administration's political question arguments. 
See Brief Amicus Curiae of a Group of Law Professors, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 
1998) (No. 96-2770). 
15 If an executive order seemed too dramatic a step, he could perhaps have accomplished his goals through 
less visible measures, such as a letter to Governor Gilmore demanding that he postpone the execution, 
buttressed by the threat of a legal action (of the sort Professor Henkin alludes to, supra p. 681) in the event 
of a refusal. Such an approach would perhaps have been more palatable politically, but a letter would have 
differed from an executive order in form only, and I do not think anything in the constitutional analysis 
would turn on this difference. If the Breard matter did indeed present a political question, then the ICJ Order 
by itself would not have been directly enforceable in court. A lawsuit by the executive branch would therefore 
have to have been preceded by a presidential demand that the execution be postponed; the lawsuit would 
have sought a court order requiring the Governor to comply with the demand of the President, to whom the 
matter had (by hypothesis) been constitutionally entrusted. 
I shall henceforth consider the constitutionality only of an executive order on the theory that, if such an 
order would be valid, so would less dramatic steps by the President to achieve the same result. 
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questions is to say that its enforcement has been allocated to a branch other than the 
judiciary,16 and in this case that branch would clearly be the Executive.17 
Although it is difficult o defend the claim that the Constitution leaves the decision 
whether to comply with binding treaty obligations to state Governors, the administration 
did not regard the ICJ's Order as binding.18 I will not consider here the merits of the 
administration's position on this point except to note that it seems strange to regard an 
order of provisional measures not to be compulsory where, as in Breard, (1) the measures 
were found by the ICJ to be necessary to preserve the rights of the parties pending its 
resolution of the dispute, and (2) the ICJ'sjurisdiction over the dispute was compulsory.19 
Instead, I shall consider whether, assuming the ICJ Order was not binding, there were 
nevertheless measures at the federal Government's disposal to protect the important 
foreign policy interests described by the Secretary of State beyond imploring the Gover- 
nor of Virginia to postpone the execution. 
Though the nonbinding quality of the ICJ's "order" gives some plausibility to the 
administration's profession of powerlessness, in the end its position is unconvincing. It 
would be strange if the authority of the federal political branches rested on as gossamer 
a distinction as that between "binding" and "nonbinding" ICJ orders. As a general 
matter, in international aw the consequences of noncompliance with binding norms 
do not differ nearly as much as they do in domestic law from the consequences of 
noncompliance with nonbinding norms.20 For a state that claims veto rights in the 
Security Council, one may question whether the formal consequences of noncompliance 
with a concededly "binding" finaljudgment of the ICJ differ at all from the consequences 
16 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (political question doctrine asks "whether a matter has 
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government"). This understanding 
of the doctrine has become the standard one. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969). 
17 Thus, if President Clinton had issued an executive order postponing the execution and Governor Gilmore 
had challenged it, a judge who believed that the ICJ Order raised political questions would dismiss not for 
lack of jurisdiction, but on the merits. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), in which the 
plaintiffs' trespass claim turned on whether the defendants were the agents of the lawful government of Rhode 
Island, which in turn depended on whether that government was "republican" in form under the Guaranty 
Clause. The Court ruled against the plaintiffs on political question grounds, but by this it meant that "it rests 
with congress to decide what government is the established one in a State," and Congress had recognized 
the government of which the defendants were agents as the true government of Rhode Island. Id. at 42. If 
Congress had recognized another government as the true government of Rhode Island, the Court would have 
been bound by that judgment and would presumably have ruled for the plaintiffs. 
18 The administration argued that the relevant treaties do not give the ICJ the authority to issue binding 
orders of provisional measures. Although it acknowledged that the commentators were divided on this question, 
it concluded that the writings of the commentators upporting its position were "better reasoned." Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 49. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the administration 
also suggested, although it did not press the point, that the ICJ regarded its Order as merely "precatory" 
because it had merely said that the United States "should" take certain actions. Id. at 51. This argument 
seems strained. Webster's defines "should" as "an auxiliary used to express obligation, duty, propriety, neces- 
sity." "Should," def. 2(a), WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1983). Moreover, the 
inference the administration seeks to draw from the word "should" is in tension, to say the least, with the 
ICJ's denomination of what it wrote as an "order." See also Henkin, supra note 4, p. 680 (ICJ Order was 
binding). 
'9 The administration disputed the ICJ's jurisdiction over the case on the ground that, because the United 
States had conceded that the Vienna Convention had been violated, there was not in fact a dispute about the 
meaning of the Vienna Convention. See ICJ, Verbatim Record of Oral Argument in Case Concerning the 
Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Doc. 98/7, at 42-43 (www.icj- 
cij.org). Paraguay countered that there was a dispute about whether the Convention required that Breard's 
death sentence be vacated. Id., Doc. 98/8, at 6-10. In any event, Article 36(6) of the Statute of the ICJ provides 
that, "in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter- shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court." The binding quality of the Order accordingly does not turn on one party's views about 
whether the Court possessed jurisdiction. 
20 See Vazquez, supra note 8, at 713. 
1998] AGORA: BREARD 687 
of noncompliance with a (hypothetically) nonbinding order.2' Moreover, the nonmanda- 
tory nature of a treaty provision is often cited as a reason for finding the provision to 
be non-self-executing,22 and a non-self-executing treaty is typically defined as a treaty 
whose enforcement has been entrusted to the federal political branches rather than the 
courts.23 That the power of the federal political branches to enforce a treaty does not 
in fact turn on whether its provisions are mandatory is shown by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Missouri v. Holland.24 The Court there upheld a statute regulating the hunting 
of migratory birds as an implementation of a treaty, even though similar statutes had 
previously been struck down as exceeding the legislative powers of Congress and the 
Court assumed in its analysis that the statute would have been invalid for this reason in 
the absence of the treaty.25 What is important for present purposes is that, according to 
the Court, the treaty did not, strictly speaking, require the United States to enact the 
legislation Congress enacted; it only required the United States to "propose" such 
legislation to Congress.26 Yet the Court found that Congress had the authority under 
the Constitution to enact the contemplated legislation. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has in recent years been taking federalism-based 
limitations on congressional authority more seriously than it has at any time since the 
New Deal.27 But the Clinton administration has been resisting this trend, not encouraging 
it. It would be ironic if the one area in which the administration were to champion such 
a trend were that of foreign affairs and treaty implementation. After all, Missouri v. 
Holland was decided at a time when the Court was still striking down commercial statutes 
as violations of the Commerce Clause. Since congressional authority regarding foreign 
affairs and treaty enforcement has long been thought to be far less vulnerable to federal- 
ism-based challenges than domestic legislation, it would be odd if this were the one area 
in which the administration believed that the states' constitutional prerogatives limited 
the Congress.28 
21 UN CHARTER Arts. 27, 94; ICJ STATUTE, June 26, 1945, Art. 58, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993. The Clinton 
administration conceded in its brief to the Supreme Court that final decisions of the ICJ are binding under 
Article 94(1) of the UN Charter. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 50. Yet, even 
though the ICJ decided in the Nicaragua case that "the United States had violated customary international 
law and [a treaty] by a number of acts," BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 329 
(2d ed. 1995), and indicated that the United States was "under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain 
from all such acts," Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 
ICJ REP. 14, 146-49, para. 292 (June 27), the United States "veto[ed] a Security Council resolution calling 
upon it to comply," Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post- "Cold War" Era, 40 
CATH. U. L. REv. 251, 255 (1991) (citing United Nations Security Council: Excerpts from Verbatim Records 
Discussing I.CJ. Judgment in Nicaragua v. United States, 25 ILM 1337, 1352, 1363 (1986)), "ignor[ed] . . . 
[the ICJ's] final Order," Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AJIL 458, 461 (1998), and "took no 
steps to change its activities in Central America," CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra, at 329. 
I am not suggesting that "bindingness" always or necessarily turns on the availability of effective nforcement 
mechanisms. In international aw, it assuredly does not. My point is that the international aw distinction 
between what is binding and what falls short of bindingness is too elusive a basis for a constitutional judgment 
about the allocation of power between the federal and state governments. 
22 See generally Vazquez, supra note 8, at 712- 13 (citing cases). I am using the terms "binding" and "manda- 
tory" interchangeably, as apparently the Solicitor General was. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 1, at 51 (order is not binding if the parties not "required to heed" it). 
23 See Vazquez, supra note 8, at 695-96 (citing authorities). See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciability of 
Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, infra p. 697, 698. 
24 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
25 Id. at 434. 
26 Id. at 431. 
27 See Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
28 Professors Bradley and Goldsmith write in this Agora that " [t] here may be some instances . in which 
the federal political branches will lack the authority to override state law, even pursuant to a treaty." Curtis 
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, supra p. 675, 677 
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In any event, arguments made by the administration in this and other recent cases 
strongly suggest that it does not think that there are significant federalism-based constitu- 
tional limits on congressional authority in this area. For example, at an earlier stage of 
the Breard litigation, the administration advanced the rather bold argument that the 
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable in the foreign affairs area,29 an argument the lower 
court rejected.30 It is thus likely that the administration misspoke when it said the federal 
Government as a whole lacked the authority to require compliance with the ICJ Order. 
It probably meant to maintain only that the executive and judicial branches lacked such 
authority. 
If the administration was making a statement about the horizontal allocation of powers 
among the branches of the federal Government, its argument is in some respects re- 
freshing. Practically from the beginning of our history, the executive branch has claimed 
ever-broader inherent powers in the area of foreign affairs at the expense of both the 
legislative and the judicial branches. Even where the constitutional text appears to allo- 
cate responsibility to Congress, the President has made broad claims of independent 
authority based on his unenumerated "foreign affairs" power. Most relevantly, the Presi- 
dent has long claimed (and the courts have conceded him) the authority to act indepen- 
dently to protect U.S. citizens abroad, even when the actions taken brush up against 
Congress's power to declare war.3' Though it is laudable that the President is now taking 
seriously the constraints the Constitution places on his authority even in the realm of 
foreign affairs (if that is what he is doing), it is surprising that he would disclaim the 
authority to protect U.S. citizens abroad through actions that do not implicate powers 
n.18. But see Henkin, supra note 4, pp. 682-83. Be that as it may, no one maintains that regulation of the 
treatment of aliens is beyond the treaty-making power, even if that regulation "interferes with" the freedom 
of states to enforce their criminal laws. It is common for treaties to "interfere with" the freedom of the states 
parties to enforce their criminal laws against nationals of the other states parties. Cf Italy Dismisses Ski Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at A4 (reporting that an Italian court had dismissed criminal cases against Americans, 
ruling that "Italian courts lacked jurisdiction under a NATO treaty"). 
29 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 30-32. In other cases, the administration 
has advanced the somewhat more limited argument that the 11th Amendment does not restrict Congress's 
exercise of the War Power. See Brief of the United States as Intervenor at *5-15, Velasquez v. Frapwell, No. 
IP 96-0557-C H/G, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1344 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 1998); Brief of the United States as 
Intervenor-Appellant a 6-17, Velasquez v. Frapwell, Nos. 98-1547, 98-2034 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1998); Brief of 
the United States as Intervenor at 6-17, Palmatier v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, No. 97-1982 (6th Cir. 
Dec. 15, 1997); Reply Brief for the United States as Intervenor at 2-5, Palmatier v. Michigan Dept. of State 
Police, No. 97-1982 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 1998). One court adopted that position shortly after the Court decided 
in Seminole Tribe that Congress does not have the authority to abrogate 11th Amendment immunity under the 
Commerce Power, see Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 (lst Cir. 1996), but the district 
courts in Velasquez and Palmatier ejected the argument. 
3" The court in Republic of Paraguay v. Allen affirmed the district court's dismissal on 11th Amendment 
grounds, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998), and the Supreme Court expressed 
agreement with this disposition of the case. The Supreme Court's 11th Amendment decisions draw a distinction 
between suits against state officials eeking retrospective relief such as damages, which are barred by the 11th 
Amendment, and suits against state officials eeking prospective relief from a continuing or threatened violation 
of federal law, which are permitted under the Ex parte Young exception. Paraguay claimed that its suit fell 
within the Ex parte Young exception because it was seeking to prevent a future violation of federal law (i.e., 
the enforcement of an illegal death sentence), but the lower courts found that Paraguay was seeking retrospec- 
tive relief because it was complaining of a past violation of the Vienna Convention (i.e., the failure to inform 
Breard of his right to consult with his consul). The Ninth Circuit reached the same decision in a similar case. 
United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1517 (1998). In another 
article, I take issue with these 11th Amendment holdings, which if followed would call into question all habeas 
corpus jurisprudence. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling 
of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. LJ. 1 (1998). In his brief to the 
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General pointedly declined to endorse the lower courts' 11th Amendment 
holdings. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 15-16. 
31 See, e.g., the oft-cited (by Presidents) opinion of Justice Nelson on circuit in Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 
111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). 
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that the Constitution explicitly reposes in another branch of the federal Government.32 
It was not that long ago that President Clinton relied at least in part on the need to 
protect U.S. citizens abroad in defending his decision to launch a military intervention 
in Haiti in the face of congressional opposition and without even a plausible claim that 
the threat to U.S. citizens there amounted to any sort of emergency.33 
Far be it from me to criticize the administration for acting on constitutional principle 
even though, had the President issued an executive order postponing the execution, he 
would likely have "gotten away with" protecting the important national interests the 
Secretary of State enumerated.34 I do think, however, that the administration construed 
its authority unduly narrowly. An executive order postponing the execution of Angel 
Breard would have fallen, in my view, well within a fair, even modest, understanding of 
the President's authority to execute treaties, combined with his foreign affairs power. 
As already noted, the distinction between binding and nonbinding international orders 
seems too flimsy to support ajudgment about the constitutional allocation of the author- 
ity to execute treaties. Just as a nonmandatory treaty can ground congressional action 
in an area otherwise reserved to the states, so may treaties validly delegate authority to 
the President to take action he would not otherwise have been empowered to take, even 
if they do not require the President to take the action.35 Even if we assumed that ICJ 
orders of provisional measures were nonbinding, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that the UN Charter, in conjunction with the Statute of the ICJ,36 delegates authority to 
the President to take action to comply if he believes it is in the national interest to do 
so. As noted, Congress has the authority to require compliance with such nonbinding 
orders. But provisional measures by their nature must often be taken quickly to preserve 
the status quo pendente lite. It is accordingly reasonable to hold that a treaty that authorizes 
the ordering of nonmandatory provisional measures leaves the decision whether to 
comply with such orders to the Executive, the only political branch that can act with 
expedition.37 
32 It might perhaps be argued that the President's authority to protect U.S. citizens abroad through military 
action stands on a firmer constitutional footing than his authority to protect U.S. citizens abroad by taking 
the steps the ICJ ordered, because in the former context his authority rests on an explicit constitutional 
provision-the Commander-in-Chief Clause. But, at best, this clause merely counterbalances the explicit 
constitutional imitation found in the War Powers Clause. In any event, only rather recently have Presidents 
begun to rely on the Commander-in-Chief Clause as the source of their authority to protect U.S. citizens 
abroad. For most of our history, the President's authority in this regard was thought to derive from the "Take 
Care" Clause. See Durand, 8 F. Cas. at 112; In reNeagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1890). 
33 See, e.g., Clinton to Discuss Haiti on TV, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 14, 1994, at Al; Why Invade 
Haiti? U.S. Builds Case, Clinton Wary of Public Opposition, STATEJ.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.),July 15, 1994, at 1. 
34 I doubt that the state officials charged with executing Breard would have disregarded an executive order 
postponing the execution. They may have complied without challenging it. Had they (or the Governor) 
challenged the order in court, the delay in resolving the dispute would effectively have resulted in the 
postponement of the execution. 
35 For example, treaties can give the President the authority to enter into executive agreements he would 
not otherwise have the authority to conclude without Senate consent, even if the treaty does not require the 
President to conclude any particular agreement, or any agreement at all, or even to negotiate one. See RE- 
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ?303 cmt. f (1987) ("An executive 
agreement may be made by the President pursuant to a treaty when the executive agreement can fairly 
be seen as implementing the treaty, especially if the treaty contemplated implementation by international 
agreement. "). 
36 Article 93 of the UN Charter provides that "[a]ll members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to 
the Statute of the [ICJ]," and Article 41(1) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 21, gives the ICJ the power to indicate 
provisional measures. 
37 A treaty that gives the ICJ the power to urge (rather than require) the parties to take action by way of 
provisional measures presupposes that some official or group of officials of the states parties has the authority 
to decide whether to take the action. Identifying the relevant officials in the United States is a matter of 
domestic law. We have seen that Congress and the President (through legislation) have the power to compel 
the states to take action urged by the ICJ. But, because of the nature of provisional measures, the decision 
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There is, indeed, precedent that would support the President's authority to act to 
protect U.S. interests abroad in an emergency even when the President does not purport 
to be executing a treaty. Dames & Moore v. Regan38 employed a context-sensitive, all- 
things-considered approach to adjudicate the validity of exercises of the President's 
emergency foreign affairs power. Admittedly, some of the factors upporting the actions 
upheld in that case are not present here.39 But factors not present in that case would 
have supported a decision by President Clinton to issue an executive order postponing 
Breard's execution, most importantly the plausible claim that the UN Charter delegated 
him the authority to do so and the fact that the Order would have been in anticipation 
of a concededly binding final decision of the ICJ. At the very least, the Dames & Moore 
analysis would have supported an executive order postponing the execution for a period 
no longer than necessary to give Congress the opportunity to give the matter adequate 
consideration. 
If there were merit to the claim that our Constitution and statutes, as they currently 
exist, leave the final decision about whether or not to comply with ICJ orders of provi- 
sional measures to state Governors, then we should all be able to agree that our Constitu- 
tion and statutes are deficient in this regard, for reasons well stated by our Founders. As 
already explained, solving the problem would not require a constitutional amendment: a 
simple statute would do. If the administration believed its own argument, we would 
expect it to be urging Congress to enact a statute giving it the authority to execute ICJ 
orders of provisional measures. Perhaps it will soon do so. If it does not, we will have 
reason to surmise that the arguments it made to the Supreme Court did not reflect its 
considered constitutional judgments but, instead, were short-term and not well-thought- 
out litigation maneuvers-that, far from acting on constitutional principle, the adminis- 
tration advanced ill-founded constitutional arguments to disguise a purely political deci- 
sion. A cynic might suggest that the decision not to postpone the execution, or even 
support Paraguay's request that the Supreme Court do so, was motivated by fear of being 
portrayed as soft on crime or as abdicating national sovereignty. If so, the attempt to 
foist on Governor Gilmore the political costs of protecting the nation's foreign policy 
interests was not only legally unfounded and doomed to failure, but also highly inappro- 
priate, for the Constitution places the responsibility for making such decisions, and 
taking the necessary heat, on the federal Government. We can only speculate about the 
true reasons for the administration's decision to take the position it did, but I would 
not be astounded if the profession of a lack of constitutional power was disingenuous. 
Of course, candor is not always advisable in the diplomatic realm, and dissemblance in 
this case could conceivably have been defended as necessary to reduce the danger to 
U.S. citizens abroad that concerned the Secretary of State. But taking ill-founded and 
whether to take the relevant actions will often have to be made quickly. Since legislating takes time, it is 
reasonable to interpret he pertinent treaty to delegate the decision to the President. 
38453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
39 In particular, there had been a long history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement. 
453 U.S. at 681. Some have suggested that presidential action to postpone Breard's execution would have 
contravened the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. But the antiterrorism law limits the power of 
federal courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions by persons in custody in violation of federal law who have 
failed to raise their federal claim in state courts in accordance with state procedures. This law does not purport 
to limit the federal courts' jurisdiction over Paraguay's claim based on the Vienna Convention, and the 
Supreme Court did not rely on it in denying Paraguay's petitions. It is even less plausible to claim that the 
statute limits the federal courts' jurisdiction in claims by foreign states seeking to enforce ICJ judgments 
involving death sentences. Finally, even if the law did reflect a congressional decision to deny the courts 
jurisdiction over such claims, it would not reflect a decision to deny the executive branch the power to take 
action contemplated by an ICJ order. Indeed, such a (hypothetical) congressional judgment could as easily 
reflect the view that this power properly resides in the President rather than the courts. 
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insincere constitutional positions in litigation is a strategy that can come back to haunt 
a President or his successors. In any event, the readers of this Journal should not be 
misled: our Constitution does not leave the decision whether to comply with ICJ orders, 
be they technically "binding" or not, to state Governors. If the courts lacked the authority 
to require the states to comply (as the administration argued), then the President had 
the authority. Either he mistakenly (and uncharacteristically) thought that he lacked it 
or he declined to use it for reasons he preferred not to disclose.40 
CARLOS MANUEL VAZQUEZ* 
4" Even the most vocal current defenders of state prerogatives in the foreign affairs area (Professors Bradley 
and Goldsmith) agree that "the political branches" of the federal Government (which at a minimum means 
Congress and the President, through legislation) had the power to require compliance by Virginia with the 
ICJ Order (whether or not it was "binding"). Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, p. 679. Their contribution 
suggests that they also agree that the President had the power to do so alone, either on his own constitutional 
authority or through delegation. Id. n.30 (noting possible political concerns that might have led the Executive 
not "to compel Virginia's compliance with the ICJ Order"). But cf. id. p. 679 (noting that "difficult questions 
about the distribution of foreign relations authority at the federal level" might result if political branches 
disagree about "relative priority of domestic and international interests"). At the very least, their contribution 
concedes that the President had a reasonable claim to such authority. Their suggestion that the administration 
decided not to exercise this authority because it concluded that the foreign relations interests were outweighed 
by federalism-based interests, see id., seems inconsistent with the Secretary of State's attempt to "persua[de]" 
the Governor to postpone the execution. Their alternative suggestion that the administration declined to 
exercise its authority to compel Virginia's compliance with the ICJ Order because doing so might have 
compromised its ability to achieve its other foreign relations goals in Congress, see id. n.30, is more plausible, 
but does not support their central claim that federalism-based interests remain important in the foreign 
relations area. 
I do not doubt that, under our constitutional system, it is often for the federal political branches to decide 
when foreign policy interests warrant action (or inaction) by the states, and that in making this determination 
it is appropriate for those branches to take into account "federalism concerns." The Senate presumably took 
federalism interests into account when it consented to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, as did 
the President when he ratified it. But these actions transformed what had been mere foreign policy interests 
into legal obligations of the United States, including Virginia. Paraguay argued that, because of Virginia's 
conceded violation of this treaty, the treaty (implicitly) required that Breard's death sentence be vacated. The 
executive branch argued that it did not require this, and that was the issue before the ICJ. Another treaty of 
the United States gives the ICJ jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures in cases before it, and requires 
parties to comply with ICJ judgments. If those orders were binding, then they too were legal obligations, not mere 
foreign policy interests to be balanced open-endedly against other subconstitutional "federalism concerns." If 
they were not binding, then I agree that the decision whether or not to give them effect was to be made by 
the federal Government. 
* Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center. 
BREARD AND TREATY-BASED RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSULAR CONVENTION 
I. RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ACCUSED OR PETITIONER 
Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that (a) " [n] a- 
tionals . .. shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access 
to consular officers," and that (b) "[t] he said authorities hall inform the person con- 
cerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph."' In Breard v. Greene, the 
Supreme Court nearly recognized that, under the Convention, the individual petitioner 
had actionable rights that had been violated.2 The Court concluded, however, that the 
'Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261. 
2 Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998). That the individual has rights under the treaty is evident from 
Article 36(1). See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621-22 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring); Faulder v. 
Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.) (arrestee's rights under the Vienna Convention were violated when Texas 
officials failed to inform arrestee of his right to contact the Canadian Consulate), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 487 
(1996); Lori Fisler Damrosch, TheJusticiability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, infra p. 697. Like human 
rights and denial of justice claims, the individual's rights should not be waivable by the national's state, for 
example, by acceptance of an apology. See also infra note 23. 
